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Abstract 
In a network of organisations the design of appropriate control mechanisms is important 
to prevent and detect opportunistic behaviour of the members of the network. In most 
cases, control mechanisms can already be seen in the business value model, because most 
controls add new exchanges of economic value between enterprises. However, controls 
encompass also operational aspects, not covered by business value models, but which are 
important for the understanding and operation of controls. We developed the e3-value+ 
methodology for designing inter-organisational control mechanisms, based on analysing 
value aspects of network organisations. We illustrate it with the case for the distribution 
of music tracks via Internet radio, where we apply the methodology to design a control to 
monitor whether Internet radio stations and Right Societies cleared the right amount of 
tracks. We present the control mechanism not only from a business value model 
perspective, but also from an operational perspective, thus showing that the control can 
indeed be implemented. 
1. Introduction 
In a network of organisations, the design of appropriate control mechanisms is important 
to prevent and detect opportunistic behaviour of the members of the network.  There have 
been studies on inter-organizational controls in business research, mainly with objectives 
to explore and explain control mechanisms (see e.g. for an overview [3]), however they 
do not address the design of these control mechanisms. On the other hand, research on the 
design of networked business models ([1], [10], [11],[12]) concentrates mainly on 
economic value aspects, and neglects the control aspects.  
In this paper we propose a four-step methodology to design inter-organisational control 
mechanisms, based on analysing the objects of value that are exchanged by enterprises, 
forming network organisations. To analyse these objects, we employ the e3-value 
approach  [6]. In earlier work [8], [9], we have extended this e3-value approach for 
modelling inter-organizational control mechanisms (e3-value+). A motivation to use a 
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value-based approach as a starting point for inter-organisational control design is that 
many controls themselves have a strong value component. First, controls should act as a 
kind of safe-guards for the proper exchanges of economic value objects between 
enterprises. Second, control mechanisms are often themselves commercial services that 
create new exchanges of economic value objects. For instance, the Letter of Credit 
procedure is a control mechanism that is also a commercial service offered by banks to 
ensure that a seller gets paid for the products he delivers (both value exchanges) [7].  
However, controls cannot be considered only from a value perspective. For example, the 
Letter of Credit procedure is implemented using various specific inter-organizational 
business processes between banks, sellers, buyers, and shippers; e.g. the exchange of all 
kind of evidentiary documents such as the Bill of Lading [7]. In this paper we focus on 
the role of IT to implement a design of a control mechanism. Hence, the main 
contribution of this paper is to show how an abstract design of a control mechanism, 
based on the economic value objects exchanged by enterprises, can be transformed into 
an actual implementation of this control mechanism. 
To illustrate our approach, we use a case study from the area of Internet Radio. This is a 
new online service for which suitable control systems still have to be developed. The 
second author has an extensive experience in developing business models for Internet 
Radio, and the information provided here reflects the state of the art in the development 
of control mechanisms for value exchanges in Internet Radio. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we explain the e3-value methodology. 
This methodology allows for modelling the exchanges of value between enterprises as an 
ideal network of enterprises. ‘Ideal’ refers to the assumption in e3-value that every 
enterprise keeps its promises; in other words: no enterprise will cheat. A, by definition 
ideal, e3-value model provides a good starting point for inter-organizational control 
design, since all decisions concerning who offers what of value and requests what in 
return are already taken. In section 3 we present e3-value+, an extension to e3-value to 
address the design of control mechanisms. The e3-value+ models assume sub-ideal 
behaviour of an enterprise: sometimes they will show fraudulent behaviour (e.g. not 
delivering a good while a customer has already paid for it).  In section 4, using the 
Internet radio case, we present a step-wise approach for designing control mechanisms, 
for which we use e3-value+ to describe the business requirements for control mechanisms, 
and proceed with designing operational aspects of the control mechanism using the 
encryption technology. The paper ends with conclusions in section 5. 
2. Ideal e3value Models 
A first step in developing controls is to understand the exchanges of economic value 
objects between enterprises. It is these exchanges that are subject to controls. We call 
models ideal, if it is assumed that all economic exchanges agreed between the business 
partners will indeed be carried out. This is called the Principle of Reciprocity. The e3-
value methodology [5],[6] provides modelling concepts for showing which organizations 
exchange things of economic value with whom, and expect what in return. The 
methodology has been previously applied for analyzing business scenarios in a series of 
case studies including media, news, banking and insurance, electricity power, and 
telecommunication companies to design value models of network organizations [6].  We 
briefly describe the concepts of the e3-value methodology using a simple example. In 
Figure 1 a buyer obtains goods from a seller and offers money in return. According to the 
law, the seller is obliged to pay the value-added tax (VAT). This can be conceptualized 
with the following e3-value constructs:   
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Actor. An actor is perceived by its environment as an independent economic (and often 
legal) entity.  An actor makes a profit or increases its utility. In a sound, sustainable, 
business model each actor should be capable of making profit. The example shows a 
number of actors: a buyer, a seller, and a tax administration. 
Value Object. Actors exchange value objects, which are services, products, money, or 
even consumer experiences.  The important point here is that a value object is of value for 
one or more actors.  10 Boxes of DVDs and payment are examples of value objects, but 




Figure 1: e3-value model of a Purchase with Tax payment 
 
Value Port. An actor uses a value port to show to its environment that it wants to provide 
or request value objects.  The concept of port enables to abstract away from the internal 
business processes, and to focus only on how external actors and other components of the 
business model can be ‘plugged in’.  
Value Interface. Actors have one or more value interfaces, grouping reciprocal, 
opposite-directed value ports.  A value interface shows the value object an actor is willing 
to exchange, in return for another value object via its ports. The exchange of value 
objects is atomic at the level of the value interface. 
Value Exchange. A value exchange is used to connect two value ports with each other. It 
represents one or more potential trades of value objects between value ports.   
With the concepts introduced so far, we can explain who wants to exchange values with 
whom, but we cannot yet explain what happens in response to a particular end-consumer 
need. For this purpose we include in the value model a representation of dependency 
paths (based on [2]) between value interfaces. A dependency path connects the value 
interfaces in an actor and represents triggering relations between these interfaces. A 
dependency path consists of dependency nodes and segments. 
Dependency node. A dependency node is a stimulus (represented by a bullet), a value 
interface, an AND-fork or AND-join (short line), an OR-fork or OR-join (triangle), or an 
end node (bull's eye). A stimulus represents a consumer need, an end node represents a 
model boundary. 
Dependency segment. A dependency segment connects dependency nodes and value 
interfaces. It is represented by a link.  
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Dependency path. A dependency path is a set of dependency nodes and segments that 
leads from a start stimulus (also called a consumer need) to an end stimulus. The meaning 
of the path is that if values are exchanged via a value interface, then other value interfaces 
connected by the path also exchange values. 
3. Sub-Ideal e3value+ Models 
In designing control mechanisms it must be considered what could go wrong in the value 
model [14], [16], [18]. The value model can be in two states: (1) actors act in a way the 
e3-value model prescribes, which further is referred to as an ideal situation, or (2) actors 
violate some prescriptions of the value model, which is referred to as a sub-ideal 
situation. An ideal situation can be described by an  e3-value model; for the description of 
a sub-ideal model we introduce e3-value+, which is an extension to e3-value. In this 
section we describe extensions implemented in e3-value+.  
3.1 The Violation of the Principle of Reciprocity 
The first extension relates to the principle of reciprocity. The principle of reciprocity in 
e3-value models (see section 2) states that an actor is only willing to exchange objects via 
all ports of its value interface, or none at all. This excludes the possibility of an exchange 
of a single value object, which, however, is possible in sub-ideal situation, for example, 
when one of the actors violated the agreement of reciprocal value exchange. 
Figure 2 is a sub-ideal e3-value+ model, which shows various types of violations of the 
ideal model in Figure 1. The first type is the exchange violation. These violations are 
represented by value exchanges 2, 3 and 6. These exchanges have one of the value objects 
not delivered, which we call an empty value object (e.g. No Payment, No Goods, No 
VAT, No Legal Compliance). The corresponding exchanges are called non-executed 
value exchanges and are marked with dotted lines, and corresponding empty value 
objects take a different name, which starts with negation “No”. The second type of 
violation is the object violation. In value exchange 4 is modelled that the buyer obtained 
only 2 boxes of DVDs and the other 8 boxes with CDs. This situation reflects object 
violation: the exchange was actually done, but the value object exchanged was different 
from the ideal model. In case of object violation we distinguish incorrect value 
exchanges and incorrect value objects; incorrect value exchanges are marked with 
dotted lines, similarly to the representation of non-executed value exchange; incorrect 
value objects are assigned a different name.  




Figure 2: Some sub-ideal scenarios modelled with e3-value+ 
 
Due to these changes, in an e3-value+ model we distinguish sub-ideal and ideal paths. 
Sub-ideal paths are dependency paths in the value model that go through at least one 
“dotted” value exchange with empty or incorrect object. Hence, an ideal path has no 
segments that are connected to an incorrect or non-executed value exchange. 
3.2 Modelling Control Mechanisms with Incentives and Penalties 
Control mechanisms should motivate actors to take the ideal path rather than a sub-ideal 
path. For this purpose, the designer of a control mechanism should be able to identify 
what exactly is the sub-ideal behaviour, of which actor, and how severe this violation was 
with respect to other possible violations. For this purpose we introduce penalty weights. 
As in [13] and [17], penalty weights represent fines, which an actor gets if he does not 
behave as specified in an ideal e3-value model. 
Penalty weights are assigned to scenario segments connected to an interface of the 
responsible actor with a non-executed or incorrect value exchange. Penalty weights 
represent fines: the more severe the possible violation of the actor, the higher the fine. 
The segment connected to an interface with ideal value exchanges is assigned a zero 
penalty. In such a way, the designer of the control mechanism can identify what actor 
performed the violation.  
To explain the method, we assigned in Figure 2 penalty weights to violating parties. Zero 
penalties are not modelled explicitly. To keep things simple, we use in this model 
absolute numbers indicating a preferential ordering. In exchange 2, ‘no payment’ we 
assume a violation by the buyer; therefore the buyer’s scenario has a penalty of 10. In 
exchange 3 we assume the seller is responsible for not delivering goods, and is assigned a 
penalty of 10. In exchange 4 the seller delivered an incorrect value object, and is assigned 
a penalty of 8. In value exchange 6 we assume that the tax office cannot violate (thus, if 
the VAT was paid the legal compliance is always granted), therefore, the scenario 
segment of the seller is assigned a penalty of 2. 
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4. Internet Radio Case 
We use a case study to present the four-step methodology for designing inter-
organizational control mechanisms. The first step is the design of an ideal value model, 
using e3-value. In the second step is the analysis of the control problems using e3-value+. 
The third step is the design of control mechanisms at the value level using e3-value+. In 
the fourth step the control mechanism is implemented at the operational level. The 
purpose of the case study is twofold: (1) to explain the methodology and (2) to enrich e3-
value+ with extra constructs necessary to model and implement control mechanisms. 
4.1 Case Study Description 
The case study is about free Internet radio. With ‘free’ we mean that listeners do not pay 
for listening to the radio. Many other options exist including pay radio, but we focus on 
free radio only. To broadcast a radio stream, an Internet radio has to obtain the rights 
from right owners such as performing artists, producers, text writers and songwriters. In 
Europe, the relevant right is the right to make public, defined in the upcoming European 
law [4]. Similar law (the DCMA) exists in the USA. Other opinions on rights (and even 
their relevance) exist, but we focus on the current situation on the right to make public 
and the consequences on controls. The case study focuses on clearing the right of making 
public. Roughly, if music is played outside the private environment, and listeners cannot 
select the tracks (but only the stream), one has to pay for ‘making public’. In Europe, 
such rights are cleared by Intellectual Property Right (IPR) societies. These societies exist 
for many right holders and many different rights. IPR societies pay (repartition) fees for 
such rights to right owners. 
Step 1:  Ideal Value Model 
A first step in designing controls is to construct an ideal value model. This ideal model 
for Internet radio right clearance has been developed in cooperation with one of the Dutch 
IPR societies during an earlier research project (see http://obelix.e3value.com). Note that, 
when we talk about the ideal model for Internet Radio here, we do not claim that the 
regulation of the Dutch IPR societies itslef is the best solution for Internet radio. The term 
ideal value model only indicates that the model represents that the economic exchanges 
between the different organizations are completely in accordance with the regulation of 
the Dutch IPR societies. For reasons of simplicity, we use a concise ideal value model 
here, as shown in Figure 3. In this model we only show details used in the further control 
mechanism design, but we do not show such components as, for example, advertisers, or 
an infrastructural component Internet Access, which listeners needs to receive Internet 
radio.  
As Figure 3 shows, in order to listen to a track broadcasted by an Internet Radio Station 
(IRS), a Listener first needs a track (or a stream) from the IRS. This IRS delivers the track 
for free. In return for a track playback, an IRS obtains audience to the track. Audience is 
of interest for the IRS, because audience attracts advertisers, which are the main source of 
revenue for an IRS (advertisers are not modelled here for the reasons of simplicity). IRSs 
use right societies for clearing the right to make the music public. Such societies operate 
on behalf of right owners, and offer stations the service to clear rights for a large group of 
right owners, say all Dutch right owners, and get a fraction of collected fees for their 
services. It is important to understand that in Figure 3, the exchanges between the IRS 
and Right Societies are on a per track per listener basis; a stream has been decomposed in 
its tracks via the AND fork at the Listener, and each listener finally results in exchanges 
between the IRS and right societies. 




Figure 3: Ideal value model for free Internet radio 
Step 2: Modelling Sub-Ideal Paths 
Figure 4 presents the various sub-ideal paths, related to control problems that have to be 
solved. There are two possible ways of sub-ideal behaviour of actors: (1) the rights for a 
played track for a specific listener may not be obtained at all or (2) the rights for the 
wrong track (e.g. track B instead of the played track A) may be obtained. If the first 
situation occurs, a right owner will not be paid at all, and in the second situation the 
wrong right owner is paid (e.g. a party who created track B, not the played track A). Both 
the IRS and right society may expose sub-ideal behaviour; the Listener has no principal 
interest to do so. 
 




Figure 4: Sub-ideal value model for Internet radio 
Internet Radio Station 
In Figure 4 the Listener obtains from the IRS a track, part of a radio stream (Track A). 
Ideally, the IRS pays the right society for the right to make Track A public (value 
exchange #1). Not paying for the track at all is modelled with the “dotted” non-executed 
exchange #2, exchanging an empty value object. Obtaining the right for another track 
(Track B) than the one being played is modelled with the incorrect exchange #3. Here, the 
IRS purchases rights for the incorrect track; this is modelled with the incorrect value 
object Right to make public with label Track B, and the dotted line-marked incorrect 
value exchange. To model the last sub-ideal situation, it was necessary to add additional 
control information about tracks. Every right is associated with a specific track, therefore 
we label all the rights with the corresponding track. Thus, Track A stands for the original 
track (also exchanged between the listener and IRS), and other labels (e.g. Track B) refer 
to other tracks, but not the original one. 
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Right Society 
Sub-ideal behaviour is tied to a specific actor. So, even if the IRS reports an incorrect 
track for clearance (Track B), the right society still can behave ideally or sub-ideally. If 
the IRS behaves ideally (value exchange #1), the right society has a choice to behave 
ideally or sub-ideally. If the right society chooses at the OR fork the ideal left path, then it 
leads to the ideal value exchange #4, so that the right owner of the played track is paid. If 
the Right Society makes a choice to behave sub-ideally and chooses the right path of the 
OR-fork, it leads to another OR-fork, and the Right Society has again a choice of two 
sub-ideal paths: not to pay at all or pay to another right owner. The path executed in case 
the right society does not pay at all, is the left path at this fork. It leads to the value 
exchanges marked as #5, consisting of the non-executed value exchanges no rights and no 
fee. If at the OR-fork the right society decides to pay to an incorrect creative party, then 
the most-right path of the OR fork is executed, which leads to the AND-fork, and then to 
the execution of the value exchanges marked #5 and #6. The value exchange marked #6 
consists of an exchange with an incorrect object Rights to make public with label Track 
C, and the corresponding value exchange for the fee paid.  
In case the IRS paid for the rights for the incorrect track (track B instead of track A), the 
right society also has a choice to behave ideally or sub-ideally, which is modelled with 
the OR fork on the path leading from the value exchanges annotated #3. The sub-ideal 
path (left path of the OR-fork) leads to the same OR-fork as was explained before. If the 
ideal path is chosen (the right path of the OR-fork), it leads again to an AND-fork, and to 
value exchanges annotated #5 and #7. An interesting case is that the value exchanges 
annotated #7 are also sub-ideal, however, this sub-ideality is caused by the IRS and not 
by the right society. This distinction is modelled using penalty weights. Penalty weights 
marked with letter P are assigned for different cases of violation, identifying actors 
responsible for violation. In this case, the right society does not get a penalty, because the 
violation was done by the IRS, which gets a penalty at the segment leading to value 
exchange #3. 
Step 3: Value-Based Design of the Control Mechanism 
Now that we have analyzed the control issues in the ideal value model, we can design 
controls that should monitor or even prevent execution of sub-ideal paths. A control 
mechanism may address a sub-ideal path in two ways: first, a control mechanism may 
detect a sub-ideal path execution, second, the control mechanism may prevent sub-ideal 
path execution. In this section we focus on modelling a specific detective control 
mechanism that can be used to assess whether all tracks are cleared. The key idea is to 
add a new right, being the right to listen to music (see Figure 5) to be obtained by the 
listener and it is impossible for the listener to listen to the track unless he has obtained 
this right. In section 0 we will show how to implement the control such that the listener 
cannot listen without obtaining this right, using encryption technology. In Figure 5, we 
suggest that the right society distributes the right to listen to the listener. Similarly to the 
right to make public, the right to listen is associated with a specific track at a specific 
point of time, therefore the label Track A appears near the corresponding value object. 
 




Figure 5: Control of IRSs 
 
Due to this new value exchange, the right society can reconcile the number of rights to 
make public issued to the IRS with the number of rights to listen requested by listeners. 
This reconciliation is provided by the right society’s value interface with three ports, 
which requires that the number of objects “Right to listen” equals the number of objects 
“Right to make public”, and equals the number of object Fee exchanged. Assuming that 
the exchange of the right to listen for a specific track is guaranteed, the sub-ideal 
exchanges #2 and #3 between IRS and right society are detectable, and therefore they are 
removed in Figure 5. However, the sub-ideal exchanges #5 and #6, caused by a cheating 
right society still remain and are not targeted by these controls. 
To eliminate the remaining sub-ideal exchanges, we need the reconciliation to be 
executed by a party different than the right society. Ideally, the remaining party that can 
provide the right to listen is the right owner. In Figure 6 the right to listen is issued to the 
Listener by the right owner. The reconciliation of issued right to make public can be 
performed now at the three-port value interface at the right owner. Thus, if for a specific 
track the number of the exchanged rights to listen does not equal the number of rights to 
make public, such situation is detectable.  




Figure 6: Introducing a trusted third party to control both IRSs and right societies 
 
Additionally, we introduce a new actor rights manager who does the technical rights 
management on behalf of the right owner. Actually, the right manager has to guarantee 
the exchange of the right to listen. This is done at the operational level, described in the 
next section. 
Step 4: Implementation of the Control Mechanism 
In the previous section, we proposed to add an additional right: the right to listen to a 
music track. So, the listener should obtain both this right and the stream of tracks. This is 
expressed by the value interface of the Listener.  How to guarantee that the semantics of 
the interface (exchange all objects, or none at all) hold? We can do so by using encryption 
technology (see Figure 7). Note that this figure is not an e3value+ model, rather it is 
more similar to an UML collaboration diagram [15]. Arrows indicate messages that are 
exchanged between actors (boxes). Numbers next to the arrows indicate a time sequence. 
Boxes with an “E” denote an encryption operation, whereas “D” stands for decryption. 
This solution ‘translates’ the rights to a crypto graphical key issued to the various parties. 
We distinguish three parties: The listener, the IRS (as in the value model) and the right 
issuer. The Right Issuer can be a right society, a right owner, or an organization operating 
on behalf of these.  
In advance the right issuer and the IRS have agreed on an encryption key, KIRS (message -
2). The same holds between the right issuer and a listener, they agreed on KListener (-1). 
How these keys are exchanged falls outside the scope of this paper, but one possibility is 
that these keys are stored on a smartcard, which is issued by the right issuer to the listener 
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and the IRS, respectively. The assumption that these keys are distributed in advance is 
denoted by the “-” sign in the figure. 
Both the IRS and the listener have at their premises a so-called secure computing and 
storage device. Such a device is tamper-proof and is trusted by the right issuer. In 
practice, a secure device may take the form of a smartcard, but it is also possible to 
implement such a device in a software component (in general a smartcard is more tamper-
proof than software code). It is important that the listener and the IRS have no access to 
this device (without damaging it). The keys, KIRS and KListener are stored on the secure 
devices of respectively the IRS and the listener. So, although the IRS and the listener 


































































































Figure 7: Use of encryption technology for track counting 
 
If the IRS broadcasts a track (1), the secure device of the IRS first requests a key, Kmusic 
(2) This key is later on used to encrypt a music track such that to listen to a track, a 
listener must obtain a key to decrypt the track. This Kmusic is issued by the Right issuer 
and encrypted with KIRS (3), a secret shared by the right issuer and the IRS. 
Consequently, no one can read Kmusic, even the IRS can not read the key. The encrypted 
music key (denoted by EKIRS(Kmusic)) is decrypted by the secure device of the IRS 
(denoted by DKIRS (EKIRS(Kmusic))), resulting in the plain key Kmusic(4). This key is used by 
the secure device of the IRS to encrypt the track (EKmusic(Track) (5)). Finally, this 
encrypted track is broadcasted and received by each listener. 
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To listen to the track, the secure device of the listener should decrypt the encrypted track. 
For doing so, the listener’s secure device needs to obtain Kmusic. So, the device requests 
this key from the right issuer (6). This request is logged by the right issuer for counting 
purposes. The right issuer compares the number of requests with the number of tracks 
reported by the IRS. The right issuer sends in return the music key, encrypted with earlier 
agreed key of the listener (EKListener(Kmusic)) (7). The listener’s secure device decrypts this 
message and uses the obtained key to decrypt the track, and plays finally the track (8). 
This control mechanism does not yet implement all aspects of the control mechanisms 
designed at value level (see Figure 5 and Figure 6). Namely, because Kmusic is not bound 
to a specific track (modelled with value object labels Track A, Track B etc.), this solution 
is not able to guarantee that the correct track is cleared, it only checks that a track is 
cleared. Thus, the IRS can still execute sub-ideal path #3 (see Figure 4). How can we 
prevent that an IRS combines a series of tracks into one track and offers this one 
combined track to its secure device for encryption? There are some solutions possible. 
First of all, the secure device can intelligently detect change of tracks. Such technology is 
successfully used, e.g. to remove commercials from a video stream. Second, the right 
issuer’s computer can listen to stream of tracks broadcasted by the IRS and do intelligent 
track detection. The detected tracks can then be compared to the reported tracks. Using 
time-stamps, detected tracks can be bound to the logged tracks per listener. 
5. Conclusions 
The most important contribution of this paper is that we showed how to model controls 
from two perspectives; (1) the value exchange perspective and (2) the operational 
perspective, here in terms of a cryptographic implementation. The example shows that it 
is really important to distinguish the two phases. To some extent this is similar to modern 
methods in information systems developments, which starts with an abstract requirements 
analysis of the system, which is stepwise refined into a functional specification. 
Essentially, what we argue for is a similar approach for the design of controls. The first 
step of control design should be high-level, and abstract from implementation and 
operational details. At this stage the main issue is to identify the economic interests of all 
the partners involved in an economic exchange, or even a larger network organization. 
Based on this value perspective analysis of each of the partners, the next step should be to 
jointly identify the possible wrongdoings by the various partners, the so-called sub-ideal 
paths. Only after this has become clear for all the partners, one should go to the next step 
and design the operational details of the control mechanism. The Internet Radio case 
study clearly indicates how this stepwise methodology can be applied. Also the case 
study clearly shows that the step from designing an abstract control system to a concrete 
implementation is far from trivial. In future research we will study in more detail the 
underlying guidelines that help the designer of a control system to make the transition 
from the design of an abstract control systems to the design of an operational 
implementation of this system. 
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